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[959] 
Pharmaceutical “Pay-for-Delay” Reexamined: A 
Dwindling Practice or a Persistent Problem? 
LAURA KARAS, MD, MPH†; GERARD F. ANDERSON, PHD†; ROBIN FELDMAN, JD† 
The Supreme Court ruled in FTC v. Actavis that a delay in generic entry may be anticompetitive 
when part of a patent settlement includes a large and otherwise unjustified value transfer to the 
generic company, termed a reverse payment patent settlement, or “pay-for-delay.” Following 
Actavis, drug companies have limited the size of reverse payments and have fashioned settlement 
terms that include more discreet categories of compensation to generic companies. In light of the 
fact that such settlements retain the potential for anticompetitive effects, the apparent size of the 
reverse payment may no longer be a useful gauge of the legality of pay-for-delay deals. In this 
Article, we argue that convoluted settlements in the post-Actavis landscape that camouflage value 
transfers from brand-name to generic companies necessitate a shift in the focus of antitrust 
scrutiny to the existence of any restriction on generic entry, together with a category of patent 
less likely to survive a challenge. We conclude with a discussion of pay-for-delay bills in the 116th 
Congress and propose several reforms to deter pay-for-delay behavior.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Reverse payment patent settlements (commonly referred to as “pay-for-
delay”) have been used to settle patent litigation between brand-name drug 
companies and generic manufacturers through a transfer of value from the brand 
to the generic company, in return for an agreed-upon delay in entry of the generic 
drug to market.1 The value transfer may include direct monetary payments or 
indirect forms of compensation, such as an assurance that the brand company 
will not enter the market with its own “authorized generic” to compete with the 
generic first-filer.2 In its 2010 report, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
estimated that pay-for-delay agreements would cost consumers $35 billion over 
the next ten years.3 Members of the FTC testified before Congress expressing 
concern for the “permissive legal treatment” being accorded to pay-for-delay 
settlements in U.S. courts, and they urged a legislative solution that would end 
the sharing of monopoly profits between brand and generic companies, with the 
aim of accelerating access to lower-priced generic drugs.4 Unfortunately, nearly 
ten years later, no such legislation has become law. There is renewed 
Congressional interest in pay-for-delay, and several bills addressing the matter 
are being debated in Congress in 2019.5 
In May 2019, the FTC reported a significant reduction in those pay-for-
delay agreements most likely to be anticompetitive based on its most recently 
released data.6 In this Article, we examine the legal standard applied to pay-for-
delay settlements in the United States. We argue that pay-for-delay settlements 
may not be on the decline, as the FTC has claimed, but rather they have evolved 
to include other categories of value transfer less likely to attract antitrust 
scrutiny. We conclude with a discussion of pay-for-delay bills under 
consideration in Congress and offer several policy proposals at the nexus of 
patent law and antitrust that strike at the heart of the pay-for-delay problem. 
 
 1. See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32377, THE HATCH-
WAXMAN ACT: LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 13 (2004); C. Scott Hemphill, 
Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As A Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553, 
1556–1557 (2006). 
 2. Federal Trade Commission Brief as Amicus Curiae at 7–9, In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 3:11-
cv-05479 (D. N.J. Sept. 13, 2013). 
 3. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 
2 (2010). 
 4. How Pay-for-Delay Settlements Make Consumers and the Federal Government Pay More for Much 
Needed Drugs: Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & 
Consumer Prot. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 4, 7 (2009) (statement of Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n). 
 5. See infra Table 1.  
 6. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Issues FY 2016 Report on Branded Drug Firms’ Patent 
Settlements with Generic Competitors (May 23, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2019/05/ftc-staff-issues-fy-2016-report-branded-drug-firms-patent. 
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I.  THE LEGAL APPROACH TO PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS 
In 2013, the Supreme Court addressed pay-for-delay agreements head-on 
in FTC v. Actavis.7 In the case at issue, a brand drug company, Solvay 
Pharmaceuticals, settled patent infringement litigation in 2006 with several 
generic drug companies, including Actavis, which sought to market a generic 
version of Solvay’s brand drug AndroGel.8 In the settlement, Solvay paid tens 
of millions of dollars to the generic drug companies in return for a delay in 
marketing the generic product.9 Actavis, in particular, agreed to postpone 
bringing its generic to market until 2015, nine years after the settlement but prior 
to the expiration of Solvay’s patent.10 This is a fairly common example of a pay-
for-delay settlement.  
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the FTC’s complaint and 
ruled that if the anticompetitive effects of a settlement fell within “the scope of 
the exclusionary potential of the patent” (meaning in most cases that generic 
entry was permitted prior to expiration of the patent in question), the settlement 
would not trigger antitrust scrutiny.11 Reversing the Eleventh Circuit decision, 
the Supreme Court held that such settlements could not be immunized from 
antitrust laws simply because the settlements did not extend beyond the original 
term or earnings potential of the patent.12 In the majority opinion, Justice Breyer 
noted the unusual nature of a reverse payment from the brand to the generic 
company.13 Highlighting legal precedent, Justice Breyer underscored the need 
to consider both patent and antitrust policies in determining the power conferred 
by a patent and, therefore, in evaluating the legality of patent settlements.14 
The Supreme Court declined to label a pay-for-delay settlement 
presumptively illegal.15 Instead, it held that a settlement in which the reverse 
payment is “large and unjustified” can “bring with it the risk of significant 
anticompetitive effects” and should be subject to a “rule-of-reason” legal 
analysis, an approach to antitrust cases that requires a finding of market power, 
followed by a weighing of procompetitive rationales and anticompetitive 
effects.16 According to Justice Breyer, the proper analysis permits consideration 
of “legitimate justifications” for the terms of the patent settlement.17 The Court 
did, however, open the door to a more streamlined version of the rule-of-reason 
test, noting that trial courts could “structure” the rule-of-reason test to fit varying 
 
 7. 570 U.S. 136, 140–41 (2013).  
 8. Id. at 144–45.  
 9. Id. at 145.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 12. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 148–49.   
 13. Id. at 147.  
 14. Id. at 148–49.  
 15. Id. at 158–59.  
 16. Id. at 158.  
 17. Id. at 156. 
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circumstances.18 The Supreme Court remanded Actavis to the lower court, and 
the last of the drug companies settled in February 2019, accepting a stipulated 
injunction not to engage in similar reverse payment agreements.19 
While the Court’s decision amounted to an important rejection of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s test (which has been called the “scope of the patent” test), and 
the FTC hailed the decision as a victory for antitrust enforcement, Actavis did 
not categorically prohibit pay-for-delay deals and arguably did not go far enough 
to address drug companies’ dedication to circumventing the rules in their favor. 
The rule of reason promises a careful assessment but runs the risk that its 
nuanced approach will amount to leniency. It has attracted criticism for its 
burdensome complexity and for lacking sufficient focus and discipline to be a 
highly operative tool of antitrust enforcement.20 As legal scholar Herbert 
Hovenkamp noted in discussing the limitations of the rule of reason, “unfocused 
explorations of restraints generally turn up something that appears beneficial; 
and as long as plaintiffs have the burden of proof, complexity favors 
defendants.”21 In the context of pay-for-delay, the courts’ attempts at a balanced 
evaluation may become self-defeating if drug companies veil anticompetitive 
settlements with procompetitive “window dressing” in order to avoid an antitrust 
violation.   
Factors that Justice Breyer articulated as suggestive of anticompetitive 
effect (payments large in size and scope relative to litigation costs and 
independent of services for which a payment might be compensation)22 provide 
guideposts to detect a potentially unlawful agreement but fall short of clear-cut 
bright-line rules. Nonetheless, since the Court’s decision in Actavis, the FTC has 
brought suit and enforcement action against several pharmaceutical companies, 
including Impax,23 Teva,24 and Endo,25 for unlawful pay-for-delay settlements.  
 
 18. Id. at 159–60; see also Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism & Structuring the Rule of 
Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 74 (2014). 
 19. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Last Remaining Defendant Settles FTC Suit that Led to Landmark 
Supreme Court Ruling on Drug Company “Reverse Payments” (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2019/02/last-remaining-defendant-settles-ftc-suit-led-landmark-supreme.  
 20. Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2107–08 (1999).  
 21. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 8 (2005). 
 22. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159. 
 23. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Concludes that Impax Entered into Illegal Pay-for-Delay 
Agreement (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/03/ftc-concludes-impax-
entered-illegal-pay-delay-agreement. 
 24. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Enters Global Settlement to Resolve Reverse-Payment 
Charges Against Teva (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/02/ftc-enters-
global-settlement-resolve-reverse-payment-charges. 
 25. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. Agrees to Abandon Anticompetitive 
Pay-for-Delay Agreements to Settle FTC Charges; FTC Refiles Suits Against Generic Defendants (Jan. 23, 
2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/endo-pharmaceuticals-inc-agrees-abandon-
anticompetitive-pay-delay. 
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II.  THE EVOLUTION OF PAY-FOR-DELAY AGREEMENTS SINCE ACTAVIS 
One regulatory response to pay-for-delay has been mandatory reporting of 
pharmaceutical patent settlements between brand and generic companies in the 
Hatch-Waxman regulatory system to the FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ) 
pursuant to the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003 (“Medicare Modernization Act”).26 Similarly, the Patient Right to 
Know Drug Prices Act, signed into law in 2018, expanded mandatory reporting 
to those settlement agreements between makers of biologics and biosimilars 
licensed under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act.27   
The Medicare Modernization Act enables the FTC to track pay-for-delay 
settlements over time, and the FTC makes publicly available summary data on 
the settlement agreements. At first glance, the FTC’s reported data present a 
picture of successful deterrence since Actavis: the number of potential pay-for-
delay settlements decreased from a high of forty in fiscal year (FY) 2012 to 
twenty-one in FY 2014 and fourteen in FY 2015, though the number increased 
to thirty in FY 2016, the most recent year for which the FTC has released data.28 
Former FTC Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen commented in 2017 that brand 
drug companies may be “starting to get the message that fending off legitimate 
patent challenges by paying generics to delay entry will not be tolerated by either 
the enforcement agencies or the courts.”29 Such a view, however, may be overly 
optimistic. The total number of settlements between brand and generic 
companies has continued to increase, with 232 settlement agreements in the 
latest year reported, which is an increase from 170 settlement agreements in the 
preceding year.30 Pharmaceutical manufacturers are profit-making entities. If 
there were no value to be gained, why would brand and generic companies 
continue to engage in these settlements with increasing frequency?31 
Moreover, the suggestion that pay-for-delay deals may be declining rests 
on an inability to categorize most of the agreements. Since 2010, the majority of 
the agreements between brand and generics fall into a nebulous category that 
 
 26. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–
173, §§ 1111–18, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461–64 (2003). 
 27. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND IMPROVEMENT ACT REQUIRES DRUG 
COMPANIES TO FILE CERTAIN AGREEMENTS WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE (2019). 
 28. FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: 
OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2016 (2019) [hereinafter FTC FY 2016 REPORT]; see also infra Figure 
1. 
 29. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the 2017 ABA Fall Forum: 
The First Wealth is Health: Protecting Competition in Healthcare Markets 4 (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1275573/mko_fall_forum_2017.pdf. 
 30. FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 4; FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, 
AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, 
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2015 (2017).  
 31. See Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-for-Delay, 18 CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP. 249, 261 (2019). 
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one scholar has called “Category X,” in which the generic agrees to delay entry 
but the FTC does not see a flow of value from the brand to the generic.32 The 
number of Category X agreements increased in 2016 to 151, rising from 126 the 
year before and a mere 75 the year the Supreme Court decided Actavis.33 Once 
again, this begs the question: why would generics enter into these agreements in 
increasing numbers if they stand to receive no benefit?  
Mindful of the Supreme Court decision in Actavis, drug companies have 
crafted settlements that comply with the guidance provided by the Court but that 
may still amount to anticompetitive behavior. Most settlements involving 
explicit compensation from the brand to the generic manufacturer and 
constraints on the ability of the generic to market its product have limited reverse 
payments of cash to $7 million or less, a rough maximum target the FTC has set 
for reasonable litigation costs.34 Fourteen settlements contained a form of 
“possible compensation” along with a restriction on generic entry; nine of the 
fourteen settlements contained a provision that the brand company would not 
distribute an authorized generic via a third party, which the FTC admits “could 
have the same effect” as an agreement by the brand company not to sell its own 
authorized generic.35 Three of the fourteen settlements contained a potentially 
anticompetitive “declining royalty structure” that involves a reduction in royalty 
payments to the brand company if it launches an authorized generic to compete 
with the first generic entrant.36 An agreement not to compete with a generic 
paired with delayed generic entry has a similar impact on competition as direct 
compensation in return for delayed generic entry. If the thirty settlements with a 
pay-for-delay structure and the fourteen settlements containing “possible 
compensation” are combined,37 the total number of potentially problematic pay-
for-delay agreements in FY 2016 exceeds that of the peak year 2012.   
Other exotic variants exist, including acceleration clauses, in which the 
generic has the right to move up the date of entry based on other events, such as 
the release of an authorized generic or another generic company entering the 
market.38 Acceleration clauses can have the effect of discouraging other generic 
companies to enter, leading one academic to describe them as having a “poison 
pill” effect.39 Specifically, potential generics know that when they get to market, 
 
 32. Id. at 264–65. 
 33. FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 2; Feldman & Misra, supra note 31, at 282. 
 34. Press Conference, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Press Conference on Pay for Delay Case (May 28, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/videos/pay-delay-case-press-conference/ftc_press_conference_ 
on_pay_for_delay_case_5-28-15_-_transcript.pdf. 
 35. See FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
 36. Id. at 2. 
 37. Id. at 1 (explaining that three of the thirty settlements containing a restriction on generic entry and a 
form of explicit compensation also contained a form of “possible compensation,” and so are counted in both 
figures). 
 38. Lizbeth Hasse, When IP Settlements Create Antitrust Headaches, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/articles/hasse-nlj-ip-settlements-2016-03-21.pdf. 
 39. Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 37–38 (2014). 
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they will face immediate entry from the settling generic.40 Acceleration clauses 
represent yet another way that a brand company can get additional “bang for the 
buck”—settling with one generic while discouraging others from entering. 
In the most recent year of FTC reports, 76% of the settlements between 
brand-name and generic companies contained some form of acceleration clause, 
with “the brand manufacturer licensing a third party with an earlier entry date” 
listed among the most common triggers.41 The actual number cannot be 
determined, however, because the FTC did not quantify how many of the 
acceleration clauses included this trigger event. In addition, the FTC’s language 
suggests that the clause would relate only to authorized generics that involve a 
third party, not an authorized generic made by the company itself. In hints of 
other anticompetitive aspects to the deals, the FTC reported that more than 90% 
of all settlements between brands and generics involved the generic receiving 
rights to patents not subject to any litigation between the two companies.42 
Additional rights such as these can be the vehicles for transferring value or 
sharing markets. 
Hence, there is good reason to believe that anticompetitive pay-for-delay 
agreements continue to be reached in the United States post-Actavis. A reduction 
in explicit payments to figures below $7 million can likely be attributed to 
Justice Breyer’s emphasis on the size of the reverse payment in Actavis.43 
However, payments below litigation costs can still present anticompetitive harm. 
A small reverse payment should not immunize anticompetitive behavior any 
more than does allowing generic entry prior to expiration of the patent in 
question. The “scope of the patent” test has effectively been replaced by a “size 
of the payment” test, permitting brand companies with more complex deals but 
modest explicit payments to stay under the radar. Moreover, modern deals now 
provide potential vehicles for transferring value other than cash in a convoluted 
manner. 
In the view of the authors, less attention should be paid to the form or even 
the size of the value transfer, and the primary focus of antitrust scrutiny should 
be any restriction on generic entry together with a category of patent less likely 
to survive a challenge. The strength of the category of patent in question must 
necessarily be part of a proper pay-for-delay evaluation by the courts or the FTC 
because, following Actavis, the size of the reverse payment can no longer be 
presumed a reliable indicator of patent strength or weakness. Nor can reporting 
requirements alone provide a complete safeguard. Given the complexity of 
modern pay-for-delay deals, the actual transfer of value can be deeply 
camouflaged, hidden among the folds of layers of interactions between the 
 
 40. Id. at 28–29. 
 41. See FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 3. 
 42. Id. at 2 (“215 of the 232 final settlements involve the generic manufacturer receiving rights to patents 
that were not the subject of any litigation between the brand manufacturer and that generic manufacturer.”). 
 43. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013).  
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brand-name and generic company. Regulatory agencies examining the deal 
paperwork on its face are unlikely to stay ahead of the game.  
Evidence shows that settlements involving delayed generic entry now 
resolve patent challenge proceedings before the recently created Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board,44 which may allow some of these settlements to escape detection 
(though the FTC has declared that settlements before the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board fall under the purview of the Medicare Modernization Act’s reporting 
mandate).45 It is essential for the FTC and the courts to correctly label pay-for-
delay as unlawful when appropriate, regardless of the venue in which the 
agreement is reached and despite the strategic construction of settlements with 
less overtly anticompetitive terms. 
III.  PAY-FOR-DELAY LEGISLATION IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 
Several pay-for-delay bills have been introduced in the 116th Congress.46 
In May 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a health care bill that 
included provisions to prohibit pay-for-delay settlements.47 The bill would 
create a rebuttable presumption of illegality for any reverse payment patent 
settlement involving a transfer of value to a generic or biosimilar company in 
return for its agreement to “limit or forego” efforts to develop, manufacture, 
market or sell the drug in question.48 The Preserve Access to Affordable 
Generics and Biosimilars Act,49 and its companion bill in the Senate,50 also 
create a presumption of anticompetitive effects in pay-for-delay deals and shift 
the burden of proof from the FTC to the settling parties to demonstrate that either 
the value transfer constitutes compensation for goods and services, or the 
procompetitive benefits of the settlement outweigh the anticompetitive effects. 
Both of the aforementioned bills permit payment to the generic (or biosimilar) 
company for reasonable litigation expenses up to $7.5 million.51 The 
Competitive DRUGS Act of 2019 would additionally impose a tax on parties to 
pay-for-delay deals and claw back research and development tax benefits.52 
The U.S. trade group for generic drug companies, the Association for 
Accessible Medicines (AAM), has taken a position in opposition to the pay-for-
 
 44. Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Delayed Entry Settlements at the Patent Office, 54 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 30, 30 (2018). 
 45. Jamie Towey & Brad Albert, Then, Now, and Down the Road: Trends in Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlements After FTC v. Actavis (May 28, 2019, 12:23 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/competition-matters/2019/05/then-now-down-road-trends-pharmaceutical-patent. 
 46. See infra Table 1. 
 47. Strengthening Health Care and Lowering Prescription Drug Costs Act, H.R. 987, 116th Cong. § 111 
(2019). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, H.R. 2375, 116th Cong. (2019).  
 50. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, S. 64, 116th Cong. (2019).  
 51. H.R. 2375 § 27(c)(2)(A); S. 64 § 27(c)(2). 
 52. Competitive DRUGS Act of 2019, H.R. 1344, 116th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (2019).  
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delay bills in Congress and instead urges codification of the Actavis decision.53 
Why would a lobbying group for generic drug companies oppose bills that would 
enable generic drugs to come to market sooner? AAM argues that the FTC 
already screens settlements for pay-for-delay activity, and that most settlements 
do not delay generic competition, 54 both of which are true. But Actavis did not 
categorically prohibit pay-for-delay deals, as the AAM claims; rather, the 
decision established that such deals may have anticompetitive effects but left it 
to the lower courts to hash out the rule-of-reason analysis.55 The bills in 
Congress, on the other hand, take a tougher stance by labeling the agreements as 
unlawful unless proven otherwise, shifting the burden to drug companies to 
disprove antitrust concerns.56 In addition to the FTC’s recently reported data on 
pay-for-delay, AAM’s position should make policymakers and regulators 
question whether generic companies still stand to gain from pay-for-delay 
settlements in their post-Actavis form.   
IV.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
We propose several substantive changes to the antitrust approach to pay-
for-delay settlements.  
First, the key criterion in determining an unlawful agreement should be the 
existence of a restriction on generic entry—not the size or presence of a value 
transfer—considered in light of the strength of the category of patent in question. 
Arguably, the legitimacy of a pay-for-delay settlement is predicated on the 
strength of the underlying patent; in other words, pay-for-delay is only a problem 
insofar as the patent to which the deal relates is invalid or aimed at the wrong 
product, since the generic could enter the market immediately upon that 
determination. Much is at stake in these deals; several years of lost patent 
protection could translate into several billions of dollars of lost savings for the 
brand company.57 Pay-for-delay agreements tend to settle litigation over a 
“secondary patent,” which is a patent on some feature of a drug other than the 
active pharmaceutical ingredient, such as a production process, a method of 
treatment, a salt or crystalline form, a new delivery mechanism, a new 
formulation, or even an ancillary aspect of a drug, such as the pill’s coating.58 
Evidence shows that secondary patents form part of a deliberate strategy to 
 
 53. See Christina Girardi, Check the Facts on “Pay-for-Delay” Legislation, ASS’N FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDS. 
(Mar. 28, 2019), https://accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/AAM-Patent-Settlement-Fact-Sheet_0. 
pdf.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158–60 (2013). 
 56. See infra Table 1. 
 57. See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., FTC v. Actavis: The Patent-Antitrust Intersection Revisited, 93 N.C. L. REV. 
375, 406–07 (2015). 
 58. Amy Kapczynski et al., Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of 
“Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2012, at 1. 
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prolong a drug’s effective period of patent protection.59 Though few patent cases 
reach a final decision on validity,60 secondary drug patents are frequently found 
invalid when challenged.61 Thus, secondary patents may over-reward a 
pharmaceutical drug’s actual innovative contribution with unwarranted 
extensions of effective patent protection, and both the brand and generic 
companies may have a good sense of the likelihood that a disputed secondary 
patent will survive a court challenge. For this reason, the category of the patent 
in question in a pay-for-delay agreement is highly germane to a meaningful 
examination of the potential illegality of the deal. 
Next, the United States should move closer to a presumptive standard in 
evaluating pay-for-delay settlements in order to achieve more efficient and 
effective antitrust enforcement. The pay-for-delay bills introduced in Congress 
will help achieve that goal, as would adopting a standard similar to that of the 
European Union that places emphasis on an agreement’s aim to restrict 
competition rather than downstream effects on the marketplace.62 Although 
intent can be difficult to establish under U.S. law—particularly if plaintiffs must 
find smoking-gun evidence of subjective intent—those difficulties can be 
overcome by designing standards that use objective criteria as a means of 
inferring a company’s likely intent. The category of patent and the failure to sue 
on the core chemical or biological patent could be part of those objective criteria. 
The reluctance to call pay-for-delay presumptively illegal in the United States 
reflects a desire to preserve the freedom to settle and to avoid clogging the courts 
with costly and protracted patent litigation. However, the current approach to 
pay-for-delay favors industry over patients, and unless the approach is changed, 
drug prices will remain supra-competitive for periods longer than the Hatch-
Waxman regulatory regime intended. In addition, deterring the litigation in the 
first place would reduce the burden on the courts, as well as the burden on 
society.   
Finally, regulatory disincentives may be a more effective deterrent of pay-
for-delay deals than monetary penalties. For example, the FTC and FDA could 
 
 59. María José Abud et al., An Empirical Analysis of Primary and Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents in 
Chile, PLOS ONE, Apr. 2015, at 1, 3–4; Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded 
Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of How Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended for Decades, 31 HEALTH 
AFF. 2286, 2286–87 (2012); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug 
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 615 (2011); Kapczynski et al., supra note 58, at 2. 
 60. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 88 (2013). 
 61. See, e.g., In re Janssen Biotech, Inc., 880 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Jeppe Brinck-Jensen & 
Kamilla Kelm Demant, Quetiapine Patent Invalidated—Danish Court Follows Suit, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dff84c34-9985-4a05-b038-2b86558e74a6; Jessica Hodgson, 
AstraZeneca Suffers U.S. Patent Blow, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2013, 4:37 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323296504578397852484365558. 
 62. Eur. Comm’n, Decision of 9 July 2014, 240–41 C(2014), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/ 
cases/dec_docs/39612/39612_12448_6.pdf (explaining that “for the purpose of the application of Article 101 of 
the [sic] Treaty, there is no need to take into account the actual effects of an agreement which has as its object 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. Consequently, it is not 
necessary to show actual anti-competitive effects where the anti-competitive object of the conduct in question is 
proved.”); Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Art. 101(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 88.  
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jointly prohibit a generic company that is found to have participated in pay-for-
delay from eligibility for the 180-day exclusivity period for any Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA) that it files in the ensuing five years. Without 
exclusive marketing rights as the first generic to file an ANDA, the generic 
company stands to lose the bulk of its profits on any generic drug launched in 
that five-year period. By enticing generic companies with profitable settlements, 
brand companies have co-opted the paragraph IV challenge, initially intended to 
enable generic companies to challenge weak or invalid patents.63 As a penalty 
for participation in pay-for-delay deals, the generic company could be prohibited 
from filing a paragraph IV certification on any ANDA for a certain number of 
years, effectively making the company ineligible for the 180-day exclusivity 
period and shutting them out of pay-for-delay settlements—at least those arising 
from patent litigation. Regulatory disincentives can counterbalance the “carrots” 
in the Hatch-Waxman Act, thereby rewarding innovation and hastening 
competition when the time is ripe.   
CONCLUSION 
Settlement agreements to end patent disputes are common and not in and 
of themselves indicative or suggestive of antitrust infringement. Often, 
settlements are a favored alternative to continuing costly litigation. However, 
pay-for-delay settlements come at a steep cost to patients by delaying the entry 
of less expensive generic alternatives to brand drugs. The ability to wield 
competition laws effectively against these settlements is of major importance to 
regulators, policymakers, and patients. Shifting the focus of antitrust scrutiny to 
restrictions on generic entry vis-à-vis the strength of the category of underlying 
patent, and creating disincentives for generic companies to acquiesce to pay-for-
delay deals, will help grease the wheels of the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
accelerate the path to affordable drug prices for U.S. patients. 
  
 
 63. A generic company seeking FDA approval to market a generic drug before the brand drug’s patents 
have expired must file a “paragraph IV certification” with the FDA, asserting that the brand drug’s patents listed 
within the FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (also known as the 
Orange Book) are invalid, unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic 
drug product for which the application is submitted. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2018). A paragraph IV 
certification is considered an artificial act of infringement by the ANDA applicant that often prompts the patent 
owner to initiate a patent infringement action against the ANDA applicant. See id. The first paragraph IV ANDA 
applicant to challenge a patent is eligible for 180 days of exclusive rights to market the generic drug product 
upon FDA approval, termed the 180-day exclusivity period. Id. Currently, this statutory incentive is retained 
even when the patent owner does not initiate suit against the ANDA applicant, or when the patent infringement 
suit is subsequently settled. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 10 (2017).  
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TABLE 1: PAY-FOR-DELAY BILLS INTRODUCED IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 
Bill 
No. 
 
Title Sponsor Summary of Provisions  Latest Action 
H.R. 
1499  
Protecting 
Consumer 
Access to 
Generic 
Drugs Act of 
2019 
 
Rep. 
Bobby 
Rush [D-
IL] 
 
It shall be unlawful for a New 
Drug Application (NDA) or 
Biologics License Application 
(BLA) holder and a 
subsequent filer to enter into 
an agreement settling a patent 
infringement claim if the 
agreement involves a transfer 
of value directly or indirectly 
from the NDA or BLA holder 
to the subsequent filer, and the 
filer agrees to limit or forgo 
research, development, 
manufacturing, marketing, or 
sales of the product in 
question for any period of 
time. Such an agreement will 
not be unlawful if a party to 
the agreement demonstrates 
by clear and convincing 
evidence that the value 
transfer is compensation 
solely for goods and services 
provided by the filer. 
 
Passed as part 
of H.R. 987 
(05/16/2019) 
 
H.R. 
987 
Strengthening 
Health Care 
and Lowering 
Prescription 
Drug Costs 
Act 
 
Rep. Lisa 
Blunt 
Rochester  
[D-DE-At 
Large] 
 
Contains the provisions on 
pay-for-delay of H.R. 1499. 
 
 
Passed in the 
House by 
recorded vote: 
234–183 
(05/16/2019); 
Received in 
the Senate and 
referred to the 
Committee on 
Health, 
Education, 
Labor and 
Pensions 
(05/20/2019) 
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H.R. 
2700 
 
Lowering 
Prescription 
Drug Costs 
and 
Extending 
Community  
Health 
Centers and 
Other Public 
Health 
Priorities Act 
 
Rep. 
Michael C. 
Burgess 
[R-TX] 
 
Contains the provisions on 
pay-for-delay of H.R. 1499. 
Referred to the 
House 
Subcommittee 
on Antitrust, 
Commercial, 
and 
Administrative 
Law 
(06/26/2019) 
H.R. 
2375; 
S. 64 
 
Preserve 
Access to 
Affordable 
Generics and 
Biosimilars 
Act  
 
Rep. 
Jerrold 
Nadler [D-
NY]; 
Sen. Amy 
Klobuchar 
[D-MN] 
 
Any agreement between an 
ANDA filer or abbreviated 
Biologics License Application 
(aBLA) filer in which that 
party receives anything of 
value and agrees to limit or 
forgo research, development, 
manufacturing, marketing or 
sales of their product for any 
period of time will be 
presumed anticompetitive and 
in violation of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 
unless, by clear and 
convincing evidence, the 
value is demonstrated to be 
compensation solely for goods 
and services provided by the 
ANDA/aBLA filer, or the 
procompetitive benefits of the 
agreement outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects. 
An agreement for entry of the 
ANDA or biosimilar product 
prior to the expiration of the 
relevant patent or statutory 
exclusivity period will not be 
taken as a presumption that 
the agreement is 
procompetitive. 
 
Ordered to be 
reported by 
voice vote in 
the House 
(04/30/2019); 
Referred to the 
Senate 
Committee on 
the Judiciary 
(01/09/2019) 
 
H.R. 
1344 
Competitive 
Deals 
Rep. Lloyd 
Doggett 
The FTC may initiate 
enforcement proceedings for 
Referred to the 
Subcommittee 
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Resulting in 
Unleashed 
Generics and 
Savings Act 
of 2019 (or 
Competitive 
DRUGS Act 
of 2019) 
 
[D-TX] 
 
pay-for-delay settlements 
(provisions of 
H.R.2375/S.64). Contains a 
provision to claw back R&D 
tax benefits for manufacturers 
engaging in pay-for-delay. 
Imposes a tax equal to 50% of 
the amount paid under the 
pay-for-delay agreement and 
denial of a tax deduction for 
payments made as part of pay-
for-delay deals. 
 
on Antitrust, 
Commercial, 
and 
Administrative 
Law 
(03/25/2019) 
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FIGURE 1: PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004–2016, 
BASED ON THE MOST RECENT PUBLICLY REPORTED DATA FROM THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION64 
 
 
 
 64. For the data displayed in Figure 1, see FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 28. 
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